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Abstract
This paper surveys recent work on learning in games and delineates the boundary between forms of learning that lead to Nash
equilibrium, and forms that lead to weaker notions of equilibrium or to none at all.
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Interactive learning is inherently more complex than single-agent learning, because the act of learning changes the
thing to be learned. If agent A is trying to learn about agent B , A’s behavior will naturally depend on what she has
learned so far, and also on what she hopes to learn next. But A’s behavior can be observed by B , hence B’s behavior
may change as a result of A’s attempts to learn it. The same holds for B’s attempts to learn about A.
This feedback loop is a central and inescapable feature of multi-agent learning situations. It suggests that methods
which work for single-agent learning problems may fail in multi-agent settings. It even suggests that learning could
fail in general, that is, there may exist situations in which no rules allow players to learn one another’s behavior in a
completely satisfactory sense. This turns out to be the case: in the next section I formulate an uncertainty principle
for strategic interactions which states that if there is enough ex ante uncertainty about the other players’ payoffs (and
therefore their potential behaviors), there is no way that rational players can learn to predict one another’s behavior,
even over an infinite number of repetitions of the game ([5]; for earlier results in the same spirit see [1] and [13,14]).
Admittedly this and related impossibility theorems rest on very demanding assumptions about agents’ rationality,
and what it means for them to “learn” their opponents’ behavior. Under less restrictive conditions more positive results
can be attained, as we shall see in Section 3. Thus the purpose of this note is not to claim that multi-agent learning
is impossibly difficult, but to try to identify the boundary—insofar as we now know it—between the possible and the
impossible in multi-agent learning situations. These issues are discussed in greater depth in [18].
1. Model-based learning
The accompanying perspectives paper by Shoham, Powers and Grenager [17], hereafter referred to as SPG, forms
my jumping-off point. They too draw attention to the fact that multi-agent learning is inherently more complex than
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which I shall follow here. Using essentially their language, a model-based learning scheme has the following elements:
1. Start with a model of the opponent’s strategy.
2. Compute and play a best [or almost best] response.
3. Observe the opponent’s play and update your model.
4. Goto step 2.
SPG leave the concept of “model” open, but here I shall suggest a general definition. Namely, a model-based learning
method is a function that maps any history of play into a prediction about what one’s opponents will do next period,
that is, to a probability distribution over the opponents’ actions conditional on the history so far. This definition
encompasses many forms of pattern recognition. The key feature of a model-based learning rule, however, is not what
patterns it is able to identify in the data, but how it uses these patterns to forecast the opponents’ next moves.
Many game-theoretic learning methods fall into this category. Fictitious play is a simple example: each agent
predicts that his opponent will use the distribution next period that he used cumulatively up until now. More gener-
ally, Bayesian updating is a model-based learning procedure: each agent updates his beliefs about the repeated-game
strategy of the opponents (conditional on the observed history), which leads to a prediction of their behavior next
period.
What exactly do we mean by “learning” in this context? A natural definition is that players “learn” if they eventually
succeed in predicting their opponents’ behavior with a high degree of accuracy [5]. This idea can be given greater
precision as follows. Suppose that you are engaged in a two-player game. Given a history ht to time t , let pt be
your prediction of the opponent’s next-period behavior, conditional on ht . Let qt be your opponent’s actual intended
behavior next period, conditional on ht . Notice that both pt and qt are probability distributions over the opponent’s
action space (which we assume is finite). Thus pt and qt lie in an m-dimensional simplex for some nonnegative integer
m. The predictive error in period t is ‖pt −qt‖. We could say that you learn to predict if ‖pt −qt‖ → 0 almost surely
as t → ∞. A less demanding definition would be that the mean square error goes to zero: (1/t)∑st ‖ps −qs‖2 → 0
almost surely as t → ∞. We shall say that the former is learning to predict in the strong sense and the latter is learning
to predict in the weak sense.
There is a well-known condition in statistics that guarantees that all players will learn to predict in the strong sense.
Namely, it suffices that each player’s forecast of the others’ behavior, conditional on his own behavior, never exclude
events that have positive probability under their actual joint behavior. This is the absolute continuity condition [2,15].
So far we have said nothing about what determines agents’ behavior, only what it means for them to learn. In
game theory, a standard assumption is that behavior is rational: at each point in time, given what has happened to
date, the players’ behavioral strategies are optimal given their forecasts of what is going to happen at all future dates.
If we combine rationality with the absolute continuity condition (which guarantees good prediction), then we get
convergence to Nash equilibrium along the play path [15].
Suppose, however, that each player is ignorant of his opponent’s payoff function. If the opponent is rational, his
strategy will depend—perhaps quite intricately—on what his payoffs are. Hence the first player will have difficulty
forecasting the second player’s strategy unless he can gather enough information along the play path to deduce what
the latter is optimizing. The same holds for the second player trying to forecast the behavior of the first. This turns out
to be impossible in principle when there is enough ex ante uncertainty about the payoffs.
Theorem 1. (See [5].) Consider an n-person game on a finite joint action space A, where the n|A| possible payoffs
defining G are drawn i.i.d. via a continuous density f that is bounded away from zero on an open interval. G is
determined once and for all before play begins. Assume the players are forward-looking and rational, with discount
factors less than unity, they know their own realized payoffs, and they use forecasting rules that do not depend on the
opponents’ realized payoffs.
There is a positive probability that: (i) at least one of the players will not learn to predict even in the weak sense;
and (ii) the players’ period-by-period behaviors do not converge to any Nash equilibrium of the repeated game.
Furthermore, if the support of f is a sufficiently small interval, then conclusions (i) and (ii) hold with probability
one.
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players are perfectly rational and they have sufficiently incomplete knowledge of their opponents’ payoff functions.
A crucial condition for Theorem 1 to hold is that the unknown payoffs are distributed over some interval. If instead
they were known to lie in a finite set, or even in a countable set, the result can fail. In this case one can tailor the
forecasting rules to take account of the restricted set of payoffs that the opponent could be using, and thereby satisfy
absolute continuity. The second crucial condition for Theorem 1 is rationality: agents must optimize exactly. If instead
agents almost optimize, as in smoothed fictitious play [8], the result does not necessarily hold.
In my view the first of these conditions (lack of knowledge) is more important than the second (perfect rationality).
For one thing the second condition is merely an ideal statement about behavior, there is little or no empirical support
for the notion that subjects optimize exactly. By contrast the first condition seems quite realistic: a player can hardly
be expected to know the von Neumann Morgenstern payoffs of his opponent with any precision; surely the most that
can be hoped for is that he knows they lie within some range.
I now sketch a model-based, multi-agent learning method that gets around the preceding impossibility result by
relaxing rationality a bit, while maintaining the assumption about complete lack of knowledge. The method is struc-
tured along the lines of statistical hypothesis testing [6]. Assume, for the moment, that there are two players, 1 and
2, with finite action spaces A1 and A2. Let Δi be the simplex of probability distributions on Ai . At time t , agent 1’s
model is that agent 2 is going to play a fixed distribution p2t ∈ Δ2 in all future periods. Given this model, agent 1
chooses a smoothed best response q1t ∈ Δ1. Similarly, agent 2’s model at time t is some p1t ∈ Δ1 and her smoothed
best response is q2t ∈ Δ2. Hypothesis testing takes the following form for each player. Let s be a large positive integer
(the sample size) and let τ be a small positive real number (the tolerance level).
Hypothesis testing
1. Select a model p of the opponent’s strategy uniformly at random.
2. Play a smoothed best response q to the current model p.
3. Start a test phase with probability 1/s.
4. Once a test phase begins, compute the opponent’s empirical frequency distribution p′ over the next s periods. If
‖p′ − p‖ exceeds τ go to step 1; if ‖p′ − p‖ does not exceed τ go to step 2.
It can be shown that, given any game G on A1 × A2 and any ε > 0, if s is large enough and τ is small enough the
players’ behaviors constitute an ε-equilibrium of G in at least 1 − ε of all periods. Further, if the players gradually
increase s and decrease τ , we obtain the following.
Theorem 2. (See [6].) Given any n-person game G on a finite action space A, if the hypothesis testing parameters
are annealed sufficiently slowly, the players’ period-by-period behaviors converge in probability to the set of Nash
equilibria of G.
2. Model-free learning
The second class of learning rules identified by SPG do not rely on prediction of the opponent’s behavior, but on
some form of heuristic adjustment to previous experience. Unfortunately, in this setting it is not so clear what is meant
by “learning”. Players are obviously not learning to predict, because they are not predicting. SPG suggest that, in
analogy with single-agent Markov decision problems (MDP’s), we could say that agents “learn” if their adaptive rules
lead to high average payoffs. (In a single-agent context such rules are said to be “effective”.)
The difficulty is that, whereas high payoffs are well-defined in single-agent MDP’s, they are usually not well-
defined in games. In this setting, agents can only optimize given what the other agents are doing. Of course, when
everyone optimizes conditional on the others optimizing, the players are in some form of Nash equilibrium, either with
respect to the stage game or the repeated game. This suggests one possible definition of “learning” in a model-free
environment, namely, that agents’ average payoffs converge to the payoffs corresponding to some Nash equilibrium.
Alternatively, we might say that they learn if their behaviors come into Nash equilibrium more or less by accident:
they act as if they were predicting and optimizing, even though they are actually using nonpredictive methods. A third
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bilities as follows.
Learning criteria in model-free environments
I. Payoffs converge to Nash equilibrium payoffs.
II. Behaviors converge to Nash equilibrium.
III. Behaviors and/or payoffs converge to a subset that has some other normative interpretation, even though it may
not correspond to a Nash equilibrium.
Let us consider these in turn. The first criterion is very easy to satisfy if by “Nash equilibrium payoffs” we mean
payoffs in some repeated-game Nash equilibrium. The reason is that, by the Folk Theorem, virtually all payoff com-
binations can be realized in a repeated-game equilibrium, provided that each player gets at least his maximin payoff.
Many adaptive model-free procedures can achieve the same thing.
The second criterion is much more difficult to achieve. Indeed, until recently it was not known whether there exist
any model-free learning rules that cause behaviors to converge to Nash equilibrium, except in special cases. Here is
one example of a model-free rule, called regret testing, that achieves criterion II for any finite two-person game. (This
is a simplified version of the rule treated in [7].) Let Δd be the set of all probability mixtures on the agent’s actions
that can be expressed in d or fewer decimal places.
Regret testing
1. Choose q ∈ Δd uniformly at random.
2. Play q for s periods in succession.
3. For each action a, compute the regret r(a) from not having played action a over these s periods.
4. If maxa r(a) > τ , go to step 1; otherwise retain the current q and go to step 2.
Given any two-person game G and any ε > 0, if both players use regret testing with sufficiently large s and d and
sufficiently small τ , their behaviors constitute an ε-equilibrium of G in at least 1 − ε of all play periods [7]. By
annealing the parameters sufficiently slowly one can obtain convergence in probability to the set of Nash equilibria
for any finite two-person game G. With some further modifications almost-sure convergence is achievable [9].
A crucial feature of both regret testing and hypothesis testing is the random search that occurs whenever a “test”
fails. What happens if we drop this aspect of the learning process? To be quite general, let G be an n-person game
with finite action space A. Let s be a positive integer and let the state of the learning process be the last s plays of the
game. Thus there are |A|s states. A learning rule for i, say fi(z), maps each state z to a probability distribution over
i’s actions next period. The rule fi is uncoupled if it does not depend on the opponents’ payoffs [12].
Theorem 3. (See [12].) Given a finite action space A and positive integer s, there exist no uncoupled rules fi(z)
whose state variable z is the last s plays, such that, for every game G on A, the period-by-period behaviors converge
almost surely to a Nash equilibrium of G, or even to an ε-equilibrium of G, for all sufficiently small ε > 0.
Note that regret testing is uncoupled, yet we claimed earlier that an annealed version of it converges almost surely
to the set of Nash equilibria for any finite two-person game G. This does not contradict Theorem 3, however, because
in the annealed version the value of s grows, hence the state variable does not consist of histories of bounded length.
Furthermore, even in the non-annealed version (where s is fixed), the state variable consists of more than the last
s plays of the game; it also includes the realization of a random variable, namely, the new choice of q that occurs
whenever someone’s regret exceeds his tolerance level τ . Hence it does not satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.
(Hypothesis testing does not satisfy the state variable requirement for the same reason.) This illustrates the rather fine
line that separates the possible from the impossible in multi-agent learning theory.
We conclude with an example that illustrates why Nash equilibrium is not the only way of evaluating whether
agents are “learning” (criterion III). Consider the following simple adaptive procedure first proposed by Hart and
Mas-Colell [10,11].
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1. Choose an action uniformly at random.
2. For each action a ∈ A, compute the regret r(a) from not having played a in all previous periods.
3. Among all those actions with positive regrets, choose among them with probabilities proportional to their regrets,
then go to step 2; if there are no such actions go to step 1.
When a given player uses this rule in a finite game G, his regrets r(a) become nonpositive almost surely no matter what
the other players do [10]. When all players use the rule, the empirical distribution of their joint behaviors converges
almost surely to a convex set that contains all of the correlated equilibria of G, and therefore all of the Nash equilibria.
(Moreover the average payoffs converge to the set of expected payoffs generated by these distributions.) We shall
call this the coarse correlated equilibrium set [18].1 It has a simple equilibrium interpretation, namely, it is the set
of all joint probability distributions φ on A such that each player’s expected payoff (under φ) is at least as high as
his expected payoff if he were to deviate and play an arbitrary action, while the other players adhere to the outcome
prescribed by φ. (In a correlated equilibrium, by contrast, no player wishes to deviate after his prescribed action via
φ is revealed, which is a more restrictive condition.)
The significance of this solution concept is that it describes average behavior under a wide variety of adaptive
rules, including smoothed fictitious play, calibrated forecasting with best responses [3,4], and a number of variants of
regret matching [10,11]. (Some of these rules actually converge to the set of correlated equilibria.) It seems reason-
able to conjecture that this “coarse” notion of correlated equilibrium may prove useful in describing the behavior of
experimental subjects, though to my knowledge this point has never been investigated systematically.
I conclude that there is a fine line between the possible and the impossible in multi-agent learning situations. It
depends on subtle differences in assumptions about the amount of information that agents have, the extent to which
they optimize, the desired form of convergence, and the target set. In the preceding I have identified some prominent
landmarks on either side of the dividing line. Its precise course remains to be charted.
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